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Defendants/Appellants Laurie Bott, Evan Bott and Jesse Bott (hereinafter referred to 
collectively as "the Botts"), by and through counsel, hereby object to Plaintiff/Appellee Regal 
Insurance Company's ("Regal") Statement of Facts and Submit their Reply Brief as set forth below. 
OBJECTION TO REGAL'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Paragraph 4 of Regal's Statement of Facts states in part that "Jesse Bott died instantly from 
the injuries he received in [the] accident." The fact that was stipulated to states that "Jesse Bott died 
at the scene from the injuries he received in [the] accident." [R. p. 57 If 4]. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAHf S NO-FAULT STATUTES ARE INTENDED TO COMPENSATE INSUREDS 
FOR ACTUAL LOSSES, WHETHER THEY RESULT FROM INJURY, 
DISABILITY OR DEATH 
The Bott's entitlement to PIP benefits should be resolved in accordance with the Legislature's 
intention in passing the PEP statutes. The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(l)(a) 
through (d) indicates that the Legislature intended automobile insurance companies to provide 
insureds with four categories of PIP benefits. This Court has recognized that "PIP benefits are 
intended to provide immediate compensation for out-of-pocket expenses and actual loss of earnings 
incurred as a result of an accident without having to bring a lawsuit." Versluis v. Guaranty Natl 
Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992); (citing Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958, 
959 (Utah 1977)). Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5) requires PIP benefits to be paid monthly so 
those injured in auto accidents can continue to meet basic living expenses. Id_ The need for 
immediate compensation of out-of-pocket expenses and lost earnings to help insureds meet basic 
living expenses is even greater in the event of a death than in the event of most injuries. In order to 
-1-
achieve the purpose of Utah's no-fault laws, insurers must be required to pay PIP benefits for lost 
wages and household services in the event of a death the same as they would pay in the event of an 
injury. To do otherwise would thwart the recognized need for immediate compensation for a 
family's expenses and lost earnings that are needed by the deceased's family to meet basic living 
expenses. 
Courts have properly denied the recovery of PIP benefits when no actual losses have been 
sustained or when the same or similar benefits have been paid by a tortfeasor or as worker's 
compensation benefits. See Verslius 842 P.2d at 867; Jamison, 559 P.2d 958,959 (Utah 1977); and 
Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995). The plaintiff in Verslius was denied PIP benefits because 
she was not working at the time she was injured and the evidence did not even indicate a reasonable 
probability that she would have begun to work after the accident. Verslius, 842 P.2d at 867. In the 
instant case, unlike in Verslius, actual losses were sustained. At the time Jesse died, he was gainfully 
employed and earning more than the $ 250 per week maximum recoverable benefit for lost wages 
or decreased earning capacity. [R. p. 58, f 14; p. 64, f 14; and p. 72, f 14]. Furthermore, at the time 
of this loss Jesse resided with his parents where they assert that he assisted with household tasks as 
a member of that household. Id. Because PEP benefits are intended to compensate insureds for their 
out-of-pocket expenses and actual lost income, the lost earnings and value of household services 
resulting from Jesse Bott's death should be awarded in this case. 
Regal admits that PIP benefits for lost wages and household services are supposed to be paid 
monthly "so that claimants can continue to meet basic living expenses." Regal Brief at p. 10 
(quoting Verslius, 842 P.2d at 867 and Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(5)). For that reason alone, 
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this Court should recognize and hold that the PEP benefits at issue in this case are recoverable by the 
estates of those who are killed Just as they are recoverable by those who are injured in motor vehicle 
accidents. The family of an individual killed in an auto accident has the same and perhaps an even 
greater need for assistance to meet living expenses as the individual that is injured in an accident. 
Adopting Regal's arguments would be unjust, inequitable and would completely defeat the purposes 
of Utah's no-fault statutes by placing additional burdens upon families of those killed in auto 
accidents that do not exist to the same extent for those who are injured. For example, under Regal's 
analysis a stay-at-home spouse of an individual killed in an automobile accident would have to 
immediately begin performing ALL the household tasks previously performed by his or her spouse 
as well as seek and obtain employment to provide for family living expenses without any assistance. 
On the other hand, the individual who was injured rather than killed in an auto accident would 
collect PIP benefits for his or her lost or decreased income and for the services performed during his 
or her convalescence. In order to treat the families, individuals and insurers equally, and to further 
the purposes of mandatory PEP benefits, PEP benefits for lost income and lost household services 
should be paid in the event of death, disability or injury. 
Regal, incorrectly asserts that the Botts claim that insurance coverage alone entitles them to 
payment of PEP benefits. See Appellee's Brief at pp 9-10. The Botts, however, seek only a 
declaration that PIP benefits for actual out-of-pocket expenses and actual lost income resulting from 
a death be compensated in the same way as the actual out-of-pocket expenses and actual lost income 
that result from injuries are compensated. 
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Another "basic principle of the No-Fault Act is to prevent double recovery by the no-fault 
insured." Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981) (citing Street v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, 609 P.2d 1343 (Utahl980); Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980); and Jones v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utahl979). They should be interpreted to prevent insurance 
companies from unfairly retaining profits at the expense of their insureds. Judgments on personal 
injury cases should "only reflect damages suffered over and above those particular types of damages 
reimbursed by the no-fault insurer." Id_ at 687. There is absolutely no risk of a double recovery or 
windfall if the Botts are awarded PIP benefits in this case. There would, however, be a windfall to 
Regal if the disputed PIP benefits are not awarded in this case. Insurers will unfairly benefit by a 
windfall retention of monies if they are allowed to refuse benefits for lost wages and household 
service expenses when an insured is killed that would have to be paid if the insured was only injured. 
Such a result would frustrate, rather than promote, the purpose of Utah's no-fault laws. 
It may be argued that decedents' families receive $4,500 in funeral and survivor benefits to 
fulfill the purposes of the PIP statutes. Those amounts, however, are needed to address the 
additional expenses associated with and arising from the death of a loved one. Furthermore, those 
amounts are often offset by the insurer's ability, such as in this case, to escape the need to pay any 
amount for medical expenses. 
It could also be argued that there is no need to pay for basic living expenses if a wage-earning 
child, rather than a wage earning parent is killed. The Legislature, however, did not see fit to limit 
the recovery of the disputed PIP benefits to wage-earning heads-of- households. To the contrary, 
the Utah Legislature mandated that "the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of ANY loss of gross 
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income and loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work..." be paid. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31 A-22-307(l)(b)(i) (emphasis added). To recover PIP benefits for lost wages, the insured should 
only have to demonstrate that income or earning capacity was lost as the result of an injury or death, 
regardless of the status of the wage earner. Likewise, subpart (ii) of 31A-22-307(l)(b) requires 
insurers to pay "$20 per day...for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for 
services that, but for the injury, the injured person would have performed..." The only thing that 
should be required to recover payment for lost household services is that services were rendered or 
expenses incurred to perform services that would have been performed by the insured. 
The wages lost and services performed are the same, regardless whether they result from an 
injury or from a death. There is no logical justification to compensate the same losses differently, 
depending on the cause of the loss. This is especially true when the purposes for PIP benefits govern 
the outcome of that question. This Court should, therefore, determine that PIP benefits for lost 
wages and household services be paid in the event of injury or death. 
In deciding this case, the Court should keep in mind that Utah's insurance statutes were 
passed to "ensure that policyholders, claimants, and insurers are treated fairly and equitably" Utah 
Code Ann. § 31 A-1-102(2), and should be "liberally construed" to achieve fairness and equity, Utah 
Code Ann. § 31 A-1-201. Fairness and equity for insurers and insureds demand that those suffering 
actual lost wages and those requiring household services be reimbursed for those losses and expenses 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-307 whether they result from a death or from an injury. There 
is no justifiable rationale to do otherwise. Regal and all other insurers should be required to pay 
those losses pursuant to Utah's PIP statutes regardless of the reason for the losses. 
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II. THE BOTTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE PIP BENEFITS REQUIRED BY 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 31A-22-307 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-308(3) allows "natural persons whose injuries arise out of an 
automobile accident occurring while the person occupies the [insured] motor vehicle" to recover the 
PIP benefits set forth in Section 307. In the instant case Jesse Bott was a natural person whose 
injuries arose out of an automobile accident while he occupied the motor vehicle insured by Regal. 
Regal asserts that because Jesse was killed, rather than injured, neither his estate, nor his heirs are 
entitled to receive any PIP benefits, except funeral expenses or survivor's benefits. Such an argument 
is offensive to fair play and justice and contrary to the purpose of the PIP statutes as described above. 
Adopting Regal's argument would allow insurers to avoid payments to deceased insureds that they 
would have to make to injured insureds. This would provide Regal and other insurers with a 
windfall in the event of an insured's death that the insurer could not have realized in the event of an 
insured's injury. Such an outcome would also create undue and unfair hardships for the families of 
those killed in accidents. This is exactly the outcome the PIP statutes were enacted to avoid. 
Additionally, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-703(3), a personal representative of a 
decedent's estate "has [the same] standing to sue...as his decedent had immediately prior to his 
death."(emphasis added) Therefore, Jesse's right, and the right of his estate to pursue these benefits, 
do not end at the time of his death. The claims for PIP benefits should survive death as viable claims 
of the deceased's estate. Also, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-714(22) permits a personal representative to 
"prosecute or defend claims or proceedings []for the protection of the estate..." Any claims that 
Jesse could have brought pursuant to the PIP statutes if he had survived are properly pursued by his 
estate and personal representatives. 
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Finally, the Utah Legislature saw fit to allow limits on the payment of PIP benefits only in 
certain circumstances. Those limitations, which are the ONLY ALLOWABLE LIMITATIONS on 
the payment of PEP benefits, are clearly set forth in Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(2)(a), where it 
states: 
[a]ny insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part may only 
exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another motor vehicle 
owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a resident family member 
of the insured and not insured under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured motor vehicle 
without the express or implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful 
possession of the insured motor vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the personfs conduct contributed to his injury: 
(a) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(b) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle 
while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, insurrection, 
rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; 
or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous 
properties of nuclear materials. 
There is no indication whatsoever, in any of the allowable limitations that any required PEP benefits 
could be denied if the individual entitled to those benefits died, either in, or after the accident. There 
is likewise no indication whatsoever that an insurer may refuse to provide PIP benefits to the heirs 
or the estate of an individual entitled to those benefits. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals explicitly recognized that "an insurer may only exclude [PIP] 
benefits for the specific reasons enumerated in the statute." Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins, Co., 
762 P.2d 1119,1121 (Utah App. 1988). Furthermore, while the issues presented by this appeal have 
never been directly addressed by the appellate courts of Utah, the decision in McCaffery v. Grow, 
787 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1990) implies that a decedent would be entitled to all the PIP benefits 
required by statute, including lost wages and household services. Id. The claimant in McCaffery, 
like Jesse Bott, died as the result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The Court of 
Appeals ruled that McCaffery was not entitled to PIP benefits because he was not an insured, but 
never even hinted that he would be precluded from recovering those benefits because of his death. 
Because death is not one of the permissible exclusions for the payment of PIP benefits, Regal 
and other insurers should be required to provide PIP benefits for lost wages and household services 
to the estates of insureds, just as they do to injured insureds. 
III. JESSE BOTTfS DEATH RESULTED FROM THE INJURIES HE SUSTAINED IN 
THE AUTO ACCIDENT AND RESULTED IN THE DISABILITY REFERRED TO 
IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-307 
Death and disability are not synonymous. The death of an individual from injuries sustained 
in an automobile accident, however, unquestionably results in the inability to earn income which is 
the focus of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-307(l)(b)(i), which requires PEP benefits to be paid when an 
insured has lost any income or earning capacity. Admittedly, no benefits for those losses need to be 
paid for the first three days, if the insured's inability to work lasts for less than two consecutive 
weeks. There is, however, no part of that code provision that authorizes an insurer to refuse to pay 
benefits if the inability to work is permanent or results from a death. Even Regal's own definition 
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of "work loss" indicates benefits will be paid for lost income and earning capacity "from inability 
to work." [See Regal's definitions of work loss at R. p. 9] There is no indication that payments will 
not be made if the "inability to work" results from death. 
While the degree or length of a disability may provide fertile ground for disputes between 
insureds and insurers, an insurer should not be permitted to escape payment for all lost wages simply 
because the inability to work is permanent or the result of death. The Merriam Webster Dictionary 
defines "disable" as: "to make unable to perform by or as if by illness, injury, or malfunction" and 
defines "disabled" as "incapacitated by illness, injury, or wounds." The Merriam Webster 
Dictionary. Home and Office Edition, 1995.1 Jesse Bott is indisputably "unable to perform" and 
"incapacitated" as the direct result of the "injuries" which took his life. That inability to earn an 
income should require Regal to provide his estate and his heirs with the PEP benefits mandated by 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307. Applying Regal's tortured use of "disability" to preclude the 
payment of lost income PIP benefits in the context of this case would defeat the purpose of the PIP 
statutes and enrich insurance companies at the expense of their insureds. 
IV. THIS COURT CAN PROPERLY INTERPRET THE AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS 
IN REGAL'S POLICY TO PROVIDE THE BENEFITS REQUESTED IN THIS 
DISPUTE 
The ambiguous terms, provisions and portions of Regal's insurance policy at issue in this case 
were placed before the trial court in Regal's Complaint [R. pp. 3-4, ffl[ 12, 13, 15 and 16)]; in the 
Botts' Answer and Counterclaim [R. pp. 33-34, f 2)]; in Regal's Answer to the Counterclaim [R. p. 
lA copy of the page containing those definitions is included as Exhibit A to this Brief. 
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30,1ffi 6 and 9)]; and in Regal's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [R. pp. 
47-48 and 50-53]. 
Decisions interpreting contracts are questions of law and are subject to de novo review. State 
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. vDyer, 19 F.3d 514, 521 (10th Cir. 1994); Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 
665 (Utah 1992); mdSimmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255,1257 (Utah App. 1994). The 
record is complete. The facts are not disputed and the trial court's error needs to be corrected. 
"Insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries" 
USF&G vs. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521-23 (Utah 1993). Ambiguities can arise because of vague or 
ambiguous language or because two or more contract provisions, when read together, give rise to 
different or inconsistent meanings..." USF&G, 854P.2dat523. SeealsoAlfv. State Farm Fire and 
Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). 
In the instant case, Regal's insurance policy promises to pay 
personal injury protection benefits to or on behalf of each eligible injured person 
for: 
A. medical expenses, 
B. work loss, 
C. funeral expenses, and 
D. survivor loss, 
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person caused by an 
accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. 
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[R. p. 8]. Regal then defines "bodily injury" as "bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death 
resulting therefrom." (emphasis added). [R. p. 9 and Regal's Brief at pp. 6-7]? Therefore, Regal 
promises to pay, medical expenses, work loss, funeral expenses and survivor loss in the event of a 
death resulting from bodily injury caused by an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle. 
Additionally, Regal defines "Work loss" as: 
(1) loss of income and loss of earning capacity by the eligible injured person during 
his lifetime, from inability to work...; and 
(2) an allowance for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred that, 
but for the bodily injury, the eligible injured person would have performed during 
his lifetime for his household.... 
[R. pp. 9-10]. Those policy provisions, especially when read in conjunction with Regal's promise 
to pay PEP benefits for death, could both be read to provide benefits for income that would have 
been earned during the insured's lifetime plus expenses for services that would have been rendered 
during the insured's lifetime. Reading all the definitions together indicates that all the promised PIP 
benefits should be paid whether the insured is injured or dies as a result of injuries caused by an auto 
accident. 
Jesse Bott was injured in an accident involving a motor vehicle and died as a result of those 
injuries. He, his heirs and his estate, therefore, are entitled to receive PIP benefits promised by 
Regal's policy for lost income and household expenses resulting from his injuries and death. 
2It is interesting and insightful to note that Regal uses two (2) different definitions of "bodily injury." 
In the "DEFINITIONS USED THROUGHOUT THIS POLICY" section of Regal's Policy, "bodily injury" 
"means bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death" while Regal's definition of "bodily injury"written 
specifically to apply to PIP benefits includes death resulting from inj uries received in an automobile accident. 
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CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF 
For the reasons set forth above the Botts ask this Court to reverse the trial court ruling and 
remand this case for entry of a summaryjudgment in favor of the Botts, entitling them to recover the 
PIP benefits for 52 weeks of Jesse?s wages, 365 days of replacement services rendered because of 
his death, compound interest at VA % per month pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5)(c) 
and attorney's fees required by Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(5)(d). 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 29, Utah R. App. P. the Botts hereby re-request oral argument to address 
any questions or concerns this Court may have as a result of the issues that arise from this Appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 (lay of November, 2000. 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellants/the Botts 
Li 
Steven B. Smit 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on day of November, 2000, -four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT were deposited in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following: 
T.J. Tsakalos, # 3289 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
l@jtfj/Vt. {7V KQALJ 
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Tab A 
147 dip * disaster 
or out: LADLE 4 : to lower and then raise quickly (~ 
a flag in salute) 5 : to drop or slope down esp. sud-
denly <the moon dipped below the crest) 6 : to de-
crease moderately and usu. temporarily (prices 
dipped) 7 : to reach inside or as if inside or below a 
surface (dipped into their savings) 8 : to delve casu-
ally into something; esp: to read superficially (~ into 
a book) 2dip n 1 : an act of dipping; esp : a short swim 2 : in-
clination downward: DROP 3 : something obtained by 
or used in dipping 4 : a sauce or soft mixture into 
which food may be dipped 5 : a liquid into which 
something may be dipped (as for cleansing or 
coloring) 
diphtheria \dif-athir-e-o\ n : an acute contagious bac-
terial disease marked by fever and by coating of the 
air passages with a membrane that interferes with 
breathing 
diphthong \adif-ithon\ n : two vowel sounds joined in 
one syllable to form one speech sound (as ou in out) 
diploid \*di-iploid\ adj : having the basic chromo-
some number doubled — diploid n 
d>plo*ma Xda-'plo-maX n, pi diplomas : an official re-
cord of graduation from or of a degree conferred by 
a school 
dH>lo*ma*cy Xda-'plo-ma-seX n 1: the art and practice 
of conducting negotiations between nations 2 : TACT 
dip4o*mat\adi-pl3-imat\ n: one employed or skilled in 
diplomacy — dip*lo*mat*ic \idi-pla-'ma-tik\ adj 
di*plo*ma«tist Vda-'pld-ma-tistV n : DIPLOMAT 
dip*per \adi-par\ n 1: any of a genus of birds that are 
related to the thrushes and are skilled in diving 2 
: something (as a ladle or scoop) that dips or is used 
for dipping 3 cap : BIG DIPPER 4 cap : LITTLE DIPPER 
dip*so*maiiia \idip-s3-ama-ne-9\ n : an uncontrollable 
craving for alcoholic liquors — dip*so*ma«ni«ac Vne-
•ak\/i 
dip*stick \adip-istik\ n : a graduated rod for indicating 
depth 
dip*ter*an \adip-td-ran\ adj: of, relating to, or being a 
fly (sense 2) — dipteran n — dip*ter*ous Vras\ adj 
dir abbr 1 direction 2 director 
dire \adir\ adj diner; direst 1: very horrible: DREAD-
FUL 2 : warning of disaster 3 : EXTREME 
'direct \d»-arekt, dIA vb 1: ADDRESS (~ a letter); also 
: to impart orally : AIM (~ a remark to the gallery) 2 
: to regulate the activities or course of: guide the su-
pervision, organizing, or performance of 3 : to cause 
to turn, move, or point or to follow a certain course 
4 : to point, extend, or project in a specified line or 
course 5 : to request or instruct with authority 6 : to 
show or point out the way 2direct adj 1: stemming immediately from a source (~ 
result) 2 : being or passing in a straight line of descent 
: LINEAL (r^ ancestor) 3 : leading from one point to 
another in time or space without turn or stop 
: STRAIGHT 4 : NATURAL, STRAIGHTFORWARD (a ***> 
manner) 5 : operating without an intervening agency 
or step (*>" action) 6 : effected by the action of the 
people or the electorate and not by representatives 
(^ democracy) 7 : consisting of or reproducing the 
exact words of a speaker or writer — direct adv — 
direcMy adv — directness n 
direct current n : an electric current flowing in one di-
rection only 
direction Xd^rek-shan, df-\ n 1 : MANAGEMENT, 
GUIDANCE 2 : COMMAND, ORDER, INSTRUCTION 3 : the 
course or line along which something moves, lies, or 
points 4 : TENDENCY, TREND — di*rection*al Vsha-
nal\ adj 
directive \d»-arek-tiv, diA n : something that directs 
and usu. impels toward an action or goal; esp: an or-
der issued by a high-level body or official 
direct mail n : printed matter used for soliciting busi-
ness or contributions and mailed direct to individuals 
director \d3-arek-tar, di-\/i 1: one that directs : MAN-
AGER, SUPERVISOR, CONDUCTOR 2 : one of a group of 
persons who direct the affairs of an organized body 
— directorial Virek-atdr-e-3l\ adj — director-
ship n 
directorate Vta-retX n 1: the office or position of di-
rector 2 : a board of directors; also : membership on 
such a board 3 : an executive staff 
dw-ectory \-t»-re\ n, pi -ries: an alphabetical or clas-
sified list esp. of names and addresses 
direful \adir-f3l\ adj : DREADFUL; also : OMINOUS 
dirge \adarj\ n : a song of lamentation; also : a slow 
mournful piece of music 
dir*ham \adir-ham\ n\ — see MONEY table 2 — see di-
nar, riyal at MONEY table 
di*ri*gM>le \adir-d-ja-bdl, da-ari-J3-\ n : AIRSHIP 
dirk \adark\ n : DAGGER 1 
dirndl \ad3rnd-al\ n [short for G Dirndlkleid, fr. G dial. 
Dirndl girl + G Kleid dress]: a full skirt with a tight 
waistband 
dirt \adart\ n 1: a filthy or soiling substance (as mud, 
dust, or grime) 2: loose or packed earth: SOIL 3 : mo-
ral uncleanness 4 : scandalous gossip 5 : embarrass-
ing or incriminating information 
'dirty \adar-te\ adj dirt«i«er; -est 1 : SOILED, FILTHY 2 
: INDECENT, SMUTTY (~ jokes) 3 : BASE, UNFAIR ( a ~ 
trick) 4 : STORMY, FOGGY (~~ weather) 5 : not clear in 
color : DULL <a ~ red) — dirtiness n — dirty adv 2dirty vb dirMed; dirtying : to make or become dirty 
disable Xdi-'sa-balX vb disabled; disabling 1: to dis-
qualify legally 2 : to make unable to perform by or as 
if, by illness, injury, or malfunction — dis*abiM*ty 
\idi-sd-abi-l»-te\ n 
disabled adj : incapacitated by illness, injury, or 
wounds; also : physically or mentally impaired 
dis*abuse\idi-S9-abyuz\ vb: to free from error, fallacy, 
or misconception 
disadvantage \idi-sad-avan-tu\ n 1: loss or damage 
esp. to reputation or finances 2 : an unfavorable, in-
ferior, or prejudicial condition; also : HANDICAP — 
disadvantageous \di-isad-ivan-ata-jas, -van-\ adj 
disadvantaged \-tijd\ adj: lacking in basic resources 
or conditions believed necessary for an equal posi-
tion in society 
dis*af>fect\idi-s9-afekt\ vb: to alienate the affection or 
loyalty of— disaffection \-afek-slwn\ n 
disagree \idi-s»-agre\ vb 1: to fail to agree 2: to differ 
in opinion 3 : to cause discomfort or distress (fried 
foods ~ with her) — disagreement n 
dis-agrecable \-3-bal\ adj 1: causing discomfort: UN-
PLEASANT, OFFENSIVE 2 : ILL-TEMPERED, PEEVISH — 
disagree-ablcness n — dis-agrecably \-ble\ adv 
disaHow \idi-sa-alau\ vb : to refuse to admit or rec-
ognize : REJECT (^ / a claim) — disallowance n 
dis*ap*pear \idi-s9-*pir\ vb 1: to pass out of sight 2: to 
cease to be : become lost — dis*ap*pear*ance n 
dis*ap*point Wi-sa-ap6int\ vb : to fail to fulfill the ex-
pectation or hope of — dis*ap*point*ment n 
dirap*pro*ba*tion\di-isa-pr3-aba-sh9n\/i: DISAPPROV-
AL 
disapproval \idi-S3-apru-V3l\ n : adverse judgment 
: CENSURE 
disapprove \-apriiv\ vb 1: CONDEMN 2 : to feel or ex-
press disapproval (~*s of smoking) 3 : REJECT 
dis*arm \di-asarm\ vb 1 : to take arms or weapons 
from 2 : to reduce the size and strength of the armed 
forces of a country 3 : to make harmless, peaceable, 
or friendly : win over (a ~ing smile) — disarma-
ment \-asar-m3-m3nt\ n 
disarrange \idi-s9-aranj\ vb : to disturb the arrange-
ment or order of — disarrangement n 
disarray \-ara\ n 1 : DISORDER, CONFUSION 2 : disor-
derly or careless dress 
dis*as*sem*ble \idi-s9-asem-bal\ vb : to take apart 
dis«as*so*ci*ate \-aso-she-iat, -seA vb : to detach from 
association -
di*sas«ter \di-azas-tar, -asas-\ n [MF desastre, fr. It 
